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1. Introduction 
Within recent years, there has been increased interest in the work of Tetsurō Watsuji. He is now 
regularly invoked in discussions of, among other things, ethics, embodiment, the self, political 
philosophy, environmental ethics, architectural studies, and human geography. But despite this 
renewed interest, there remain many underexplored areas in his work worthy of further attention. 
In what follows, I draw attention to one of these areas: Watsuji’s discussion of intentionality.  
As part of his more general discussion of embodiment, subjectivity, and intersubjectivity, 
Watsuji develops a rich characterization of intentionality, or the capacity of conscious states to 
be about things. I am here especially concerned with Watsuji’s arguments for the inherently 
social character of intentionality. This is the idea that both the character and content of our 
intentional acts — which determine how the world and things in it show up as objects of 
experience — are deeply regulated by our sociocultural milieu or “betweenness” (aidagara), as 
he terms it. Accordingly, we cannot understand intentionality without considering its constitutive 
relation with betweenness. While provocative, this aspect of Watsuji’s work has thus far received 
little attention.     
In light of this neglect, the following discussion has two main objectives: interpretation and 
application (the former will receive more attention than the latter). First, I unpack Watsuji’s 
discussion of the social character of intentionality, show how it connects with his more general 
discussion of embodiment and betweenness, and then situate this characterization alongside 
phenomenological discussions of intentionality found in thinkers like Husserl, Heidegger, and 
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Merleau-Ponty. Second, I put Watsuji’s ideas to work. I argue that Watsuji’s characterization of 
the social character of intentionality is relevant to current discussions in phenomenological 
psychopathology. I look especially at how it can help illuminate the character and structure of 
some anomalous experiences in schizophrenia in which individuals become experientially 
unmoored from other people and things. I argue further that this application can enrich existing 
attempts to connect Watsuji and psychopathology, such as those found in the work of the 
psychiatrist Bin Kimura.  
To be clear, I am not going to spend a lot of time evaluating the success of Watsuji’s 
arguments or considering possible objections, although I find many of his arguments compelling 
and will offer philosophical and empirical support for them along the way. A thorough defense is 
a project for another time. Instead, my primary aim is simply to bring some of these arguments to 
light and show their ongoing relevance to current debates. I turn to that task now.  
 
2. Watsuji on intentionality and the dynamics of betweenness 
This is not the place for an overview of Watsuji’s large corpus.1 Instead, I offer a brief summary 
of some of his central ideas, focusing on those most relevant for understanding his 
characterization of intentionality. At the heart of Watsuji’s approach — particularly in Rinrigaku 
(“Ethics”) (1996), arguably his most important work and one of only a few texts translated into 
English — is his phenomenology of aidagara, or “betweenness”. For Watsuji, aidagara captures 
experiential and enactive dynamics that generate basic forms of embodied selfhood (Krueger 
2013a; McCarthy 2011b). Nearly all his remarks in Rinrigaku about ethics, social ontology, and 
the self originate in some way from this notion (Shields 2009). Near the start of this text he tells 
us that, “[t]he locus of ethical problems lies not in the consciousness of the isolated individual, 
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but precisely in the in-betweenness of person and person” (Watsuji 1996, 10). So, it’s important 
to get clear at the start about what betweenness means for Watsuji before then looking at how it 
connects with his characterization of intentionality. 
    
2.1 Watsuji on betweenness 
Simply put, aidagara for Watsuji refers to the various ways that human reality is organized by 
dimensions and intensities of spatiality. However, this idea refers to more than the trivial 
observation that human beings, like other things in the world, take up space and therefore stand 
in determinate spatial relations with one another like trees in a forest or furniture in a room. 
Importantly for Watsuji, “[t]his sort of spatiality [i.e., of aidagara] is not the same as space in the 
world of nature”; it is rather, lived space, “the betweenness itself of subjective human beings” 
(Watsuji 1996, 156-157).  
For Watsuji, this betweenness can take many forms: from the bodily intimacy of newborn-
caregiver interactions or sexual intercourse, to more encompassing forms of betweenness like 
emotional contagion within large groups (e.g., sporting events, political rallies), or even the ways 
that material infrastructures organize flows of information, communication, and transportation 
that constrain opportunities for connection between individuals and communities. According to 
Watsuji, to be a human being is not just to exist in time — á la Heidegger, an important 
influence on Watsuji — but also in and through multiple dimensions and intensities of space.2 
This spatial orientation is fundamental to our experience of self and world. As he summarizes his 
view here: “I regard this subjective spatiality as the essential characteristic of human beings. 
Without it, the systematic relationships between personalities could not be understood” (Watsuji 
1996, 157).  
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Early in Rinrigaku, Watsuji tells us that aidagara implies “a living and dynamic 
betweenness, as a subjective interconnection of acts” (Watsuji 1996, 18). Already in this brief 
characterization, two important points are worth noting. First, aidagara for Watsuji is 
inextricably linked with subjectivity, the first-person perspective; we experience and live through 
dimensions and intensities of aidagara. Second, aidagara is tied to the dynamics of our 
embodied agency; it is something we play an active role in creating and sustaining. To 
understand aidagara then, we must develop a fuller picture of what it means to be an embodied 
subject engaging with the biological, sociocultural, and material environments that comprise our 
shared world. 
The starting point for Watsuji’s phenomenological analysis of aidagara is his discussion 
— echoing analysis found in phenomenologists like Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and Sartre — of the 
lived body (Krueger 2013a; McCarthy 2011a). Watsuji argues that to be an embodied, animate 
subject is to concretely realize betweenness; the latter is an internal principle of the self that 
specifies the “dual structure” of our embodiment (Watsuji 1996, 19). What this means is that, as 
embodied beings, we are hybrid entities: we realize “a dialectical unity” (15) of both objective 
and subjective dimensions. On one hand, we have physical bodies with properties like size, 
shape, color, texture and weight. Our physical bodies are objects situated in the world alongside 
other objects, “an organism of the sort that physiology expounds” (59). We can causally interact 
with other things in the world in virtue of this physical nature. But our embodiment is not 
exhausted by our physiology. This is because, on the other hand, we are also lived bodies: we 
experience an immediate first-person intimacy with our bodies from the inside. And from this 
first-person perspective, the body is experientially manifest not as an object or content of our 
perception, belief, or attitude, but rather as the transparent vehicle through which we engage with 
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the world and others (65). Simply put, to be an embodied subject for Watsuji is to concretely 
realize the space between pure objectivity or pure subjectivity.   
Insofar as aidagara is rooted in basic structures of our embodiment and agency, Watsuji 
argues that it is amenable to phenomenological analysis. Rinrigaku is his attempt to offer such an 
analysis. But this does not mean that Watsuji uncritically adopts the methods and concepts of his 
phenomenological peers. To make this point clearer, we can further unpack this embodied 
reading of aidagara by linking it with Watsuji’s discussion of intentionality — a 
phenomenological characterization that builds on the work of Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-
Ponty but which also departs from their analysis in some important ways, too.  
 
2.2 Intentionality and betweenness 
In its technical phenomenological usage, “intentionality” — from the Latin verb intendo (“aim”, 
“hold out”, or “stretch”) — refers to the way that consciousness can be about things, that is, the 
way it can stretch out or be directed toward objects both internal (mental images, memories, 
fictional objects) and external (things, relations, and events in the world). Conscious mental 
states are never empty; they always take objects that provide their content. Since intentionality is 
a central feature of consciousness — it captures the capacity of consciousness to transcend itself 
and reach out and grasp a meaningful world — the task of phenomenology is therefore a careful 
investigation of the character and structure of our various intentional relations with the world and 
things in it (Krueger 2019a).      
For Husserl, intentionality belongs first and foremost to consciousness. This is because 
experiences are what direct us to various objects and present those objects as meaningful. In 
other words, these experiences “constitute”, to use a technical phenomenological term, the 
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manner or “how” of an object’s appearance to consciousness: as an object of perception, 
judgment, belief, memory, desire, etc. To be clear, this does not mean for Husserl that 
consciousness somehow creates the object that it constitutes; nor does it mean that 
phenomenologists think we only ever experience internal representations of a mind-independent 
world. Despite other often-significant differences, early phenomenologists all insist that mind 
and world are fundamentally bound up with one another; the intentional openness of 
consciousness is part of its essential nature as embedded in the world, in direct contact with the 
people and things around it (Zahavi 2008). The point of this “constitution talk” is to highlight the 
fact that we always experience objects in particular sorts of ways, via distinctive meanings that 
determine their salience and character. 
For example, I can see an apple as a piece of fruit, as something that invites eating, or as 
something that belongs to a colleague such as when I’m hungrily scanning the contents of a 
shared refrigerator at work; I can also judge that the apple is overripe, desire that it was less so, 
believe that it’s a Gala apple, assess that it affords throwing, etc. In these cases, I experience the 
same apple. But I do so via different modes of presentation, different experiential structures that 
allow the apple to manifest in my experience of it in different ways. According to 
phenomenologists, this “how” of an object’s appearance to consciousness, its mode of 
presentation, reflects the constituting activity of the subject. Subjects play an active role in 
shaping the form and meaning of their experience. Once more, however, since intentionality is a 
relational phenomenon for phenomenologists (i.e., not something confined to the head), this 
activity is part of experiential structures that lead us back to the world — to the objects these 
modes of appearance are correlated with. As Husserl tells us: 
7 
[T]he objects of which we are “conscious”, are not found simply in consciousness 
as in a box, so that they can merely be found in it and snatched at in it; [...] they are 
first constituted as being what they are for us, and as what they count as for us, in 
varying forms of objective intention (Husserl 2001, 276)  
Despite Husserl’s repeated insistence on the world-engaged character of intentionality, 
subsequent phenomenologists like Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty — and Watsuji, as we’ll see — 
nevertheless challenge what they perceive to be unwelcome Cartesian and idealist elements of 
Husserl’s account of intentionality, at least in its early formulations.3 Heidegger, for example, 
argues that intentionality is a feature of Dasein’s entire way of being-in-the-world. Accordingly, 
he develops his analysis of intentionality — or as he prefers, “comportment” (Verhaltung) — not 
by focusing on mental activity alone but rather the various ways that a meaningful world is 
disclosed via our historically-conditioned projects. Similarly, Merleau-Ponty reacts to what he 
sees as Husserl’s excessive cognitivism by foregrounding the bodily dimension of intentionality: 
a “motor intentionality”, or form of bodily understanding, that allows us to remain spontaneously 
open and responsive to the people and things around us.   
At first blush, Watsuji’s critique appears to simply echo themes found in Heidegger and 
Merleau-Ponty. He expresses similar concerns about the excessively cognitivist overtones he 
finds in Husserlian approaches to intentionality. Instead of characterizing intentionality as an 
intrinsic feature of individual mental states, Watsuji prefers to speak of “practical act-
connections”: ongoing patterns of worldly engagements in which individuals enter into 
“relationships of reciprocal activity” with their environment (Watsuji 1996, 33). In the activity of 
seeing, for example, we don’t passively register our environment. We engage with it; seeing is a 
kind of doing. As Watsuji puts it, “[c]oncretely speaking, we perform the activity of seeing, not 
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merely that of intentional activity” (34). Within our activities of seeing we touch, handle, probe, 
manipulate, and actively negotiate the things and spaces around us. And these things and spaces, 
in turn, engage with us; they help specify the character and content of visual perception by 
resisting, yielding, breaking, changing, or otherwise responding to the patterns and dynamics of 
our ongoing engagements.4 Similarly, in the “betweenness” of seeing another person, “one’s 
activity of seeing, is a seeing determined, conversely, by its being seen by the other” (33). For 
Watsuji, social perception is also a reciprocally determined activity: “seeing each other, staring, 
looking angrily at, glimpsing, looking at nervously, seeing while pretending not to see, gazing on 
in rapture, and so forth” are jointly-constructed processes involving complex tangles of feedback 
distributed across multiple subjects (33). In sum, intentionality for Watsuji is a robustly 
embodied and situated affair — an ongoing activity of disclosing a meaningful world within 
various forms of reciprocity and betweenness.      
 
2.3 The social character of intentionality 
Already this brief summary is enough to mark Watsuji as having made a useful contribution to 
phenomenological approaches to intentionality. However, Watsuji develops a stronger — and 
potentially more radical — critique of individualist approaches to intentionality than either 
Heidegger or Merleau-Ponty. As we’ll see later, this stronger critique is where Watsuji’s analysis 
becomes particularly useful in illuminating the character of some experiential disturbances in 
schizophrenia.    
Simply put, Watsuji argues that consciousness and intentionality are constitutively social. 
From the start, consciousness is regulated by various sociocultural forms of betweenness that 
specify its intentional character and content. So, his worry is not (following Heidegger and 
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Merleau-Ponty) just that orthodox approaches overlook the practical and bodily character of 
intentionality, although he thinks they do. Rather, the idea is that all forms of intentionality 
depend upon — insofar as they are regulated and sustained by — our interactions with others, 
that is, by the dynamics of betweenness. As he puts it: “No matter which aspect of consciousness 
we may lay hold of, none can be said to be essentially independent. The independent 
consciousness of I is acquired only when isolated from any connection at all with other 
consciousnesses” (Watsuji 1996, 80). Similarly, he elsewhere tells us that, “What is called 
intentional activity is nothing more than the product of abstraction that first of all excludes the 
relational elements from our acts, and then posits the residue as an activity of individual 
consciousness” (34).   
To be clear — and despite Watsuji’s sometimes overstated protestations to the contrary5 — 
early phenomenologists are also sensitive to the connection between intentionality and sociality. 
Husserl, for example, argues for the central role of intersubjectivity in constituting our 
experience of the world. He insists that our ability to experience objects as transcendent — i.e., 
as objective mind-independent phenomena — depends upon our awareness that these objects can 
be experienced by other subjects. In other words, an object’s intersubjective accessibility — the 
fact that it is potentially given to another subject as an object of their experience — guarantees 
its real transcendence (Zahavi 2003, 115–116). For his part, Heidegger argues that the rich 
network of artifacts, practices, and projects into which Dasein is “thrown” comprise historically 
conditioned contexts whose meanings and possibilities are largely established by others. Watsuji 
would agree with these claims. However, he appears to be making an even stronger claim: 
namely, the “deep structure” of intentionality, as we might refer to it, is constitutively regulated 
by features of the betweenness within which that intentional activity first arises.    
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One argumentative strategy Watsuji uses to defend this claim is to select candidate 
experiences that initially appear to be examples of experiences “essentially independent” of the 
social world (i.e., betweenness), and then show that these experiences nevertheless remain 
irreducibly social insofar as their intentional structure is regulated by “specific social forms” that 
preexist our individual development (Watsuji 1996, 74). To head off an immediate worry: 
Watsuji is not suggesting that individual subjects cannot realize their own unique set of token 
experiences. He would not dispute, for example, that the slight twinge in my lower back or 
growing fatigue I feel from sitting in front of my computer too long are my experiences, manifest 
at this moment only to me. His point, rather, is that these token experiences — like all episodes 
of consciousness — are inextricably regulated by their interpersonal milieu, hence their social 
nature. Looking at some of his examples will help clarify the scope of his claim.      
Consider first desires (Watsuji 1996, 73). We might think that we are individuated as 
conscious subjects by our constellation of idiosyncratic desires: e.g., aesthetic preferences, 
sexual desires, etc. But Watsuji disagrees. While token episodes of desiring (e.g., a piece of cake, 
a Belgian beer, a holiday, lusting after a celebrity) may be uniquely ours, both the character and 
content of our desire — the way it is manifest from within the desiring experience, its particular 
mode of presentation — are only intelligible against a shared intersubjective milieu or 
“communal consciousness”, as he puts it, in which the desire “is socially qualified or modified” 
(74). More simply, we learn both what to desire and how to desire it from others, including how 
to enact bodily practices for satiating and sustaining these desires. 
 As I read Watsuji, this is not just the claim that desires are “contagious” insofar as we 
often inherit them from the people around us via cultural narratives, media and advertising, or 
the enthusiasm of family members and friends — although Watsuji would probably agree. His 
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more interesting claim, I think, is that the social modulation of our desiring practices runs even 
deeper than this sort of external desire contagion. In short, we learn how to constitute intentional 
objects as desirable from others. This is because, via deeply enculturated “somatic modes of 
attention” (Csordas 1993), we first become bodily sensitive to features of our world that manifest 
as worthy of our desirous attention; these modes of attention and expression are regulated from 
birth by the ongoing input of those around us, particularly caregivers who shape the early 
development of attentional practices that bring specific parts of the world into view (while 
occluding others) and present them as worthy of desiring in the first place (Krueger 2013b; 
Spurrett and Cowley 2010) (more on this point below). The important point, then, is that the 
ontogenesis of these somatic modes of attention — by which the world is constituted as a rich 
landscape of potential desire-worthy objects — does not unfold independently of others, based 
solely on our own endogenous capacities. Rather, these forms of attention are elaborated within 
phenomenological structures and bodily practices that constitutively depend upon the ongoing 
support and regulation of our sociocultural betweenness. If this point still seems somewhat 
elusive, the second example Watsuji considers may help clarify further (I will also consider some 
relevant empirical literature).  
A second candidate for an experience we might think is “essentially independent” of the 
social world is visual perception (Watsuji 1996, 73). Since perception connects most directly 
with phenomenological discussions of intentionality — and it might initially appear to be the 
most promising candidate for a genuinely individualistic experience — it’s worth looking at in 
more detail. Watsuji begins by asking us to imagine a simple experience: staring at a wall. This 
experience initially appears to be, he suggests, an authentically individualistic experience insofar 
as it is an experience “of the “I” as existing alone, in which there is no one else with whom the 
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“I” shares the same consciousness” (73). Put another way, it seems that how the wall appears, 
experientially — its mode of presentation as an object of my visual perception — is specified 
independently of my connection with others. I simply see it, or I don’t. And my visual system 
would work the way that it does even if I’d never encountered another person.     
In one sense, of course, this experience is an individual experience. At that moment, the 
token “staring at the wall” experience realized by my perceptual consciousness is uniquely mine. 
Even if someone else is standing very close to me and staring at the same point of the wall, they 
will have their own token experience, numerically distinct from mine. However, once again, 
Watsuji’s claim does not entail the implausible rejection of the numerical distinctiveness of 
token episodes of experience. Rather, the idea seems to be that every token episode reflects a 
sociocultural type. In other words, even in these kinds of highly sanitized, stripped-down 
experiences, sociocultural betweenness regulates the intentional character and content of such an 
experience. In this sense do we “share the same consciousness”, as Watsuji puts it. 
Watsuji’s argument here is phenomenological. He tells us that, in seeing a wall as a wall, 
“social consciousness has already intervened” (Watsuji 1996, 73). This is because walls have 
specific forms and functions — meanings — that both reflect their sociocultural context and 
which distinguish them from other intentional objects such as desks, books, trees, and other 
people. In other words, we do not first perceive uninterpreted sensory units (colors, shapes, 
textures, etc.), and only then integrate and assign them meaning. Rather, intentional objects like 
walls show up, experientially, as already saturated with meaning, as embedded in shared contexts 
that specify their salience and significance. As Watsuji tells us:  
The consciousness we possess in our daily lives is never a collection of sensations. 
Even when we remain in our study alone, we are still conscious of a wall as a wall, 
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of a desk as a desk, and of a book as a book...from the beginning we must concern 
ourselves with tools and assume there is no more primitive consciousness than this 
concern (73).  
The important point here for Watsuji is that the form these tools take — the “how” by which they 
manifest as meaning-saturated intentional objects — is not the product of an individual 
consciousness but “rather exhibits a meaning common to all those who are concerned with this 
tool” (73). Things like walls, tables, and desks have structures, names, and functions that reflect 
the sociocultural betweenness in which they are situated. This betweenness regulates how things 
and spaces show up for consciousness as meaningful (intentional) objects of experience. 
Before concluding this section, we can note that there are different streams of empirical 
evidence that appear to support Watsuji’s claim about the interrelation of betweenness, attention, 
and visual perception. These studies suggest that basic attentional processes by which individuals 
constitute intentional objects may be modulated by the sociocultural contexts in which these 
processes arise. For example, Chua and colleagues (2005) conducted eye-tracking studies with 
East Asian and American subjects. They found that when presented with images of animals and 
non-living objects like cars, planes, and boats, East Asian subjects spent more time looking at the 
background of objects than did their American counterparts. They conclude that this variation in 
eye movements indicates a difference in terms of how attentional resources are allocated — a 
variation that stems, in part, from different factors in experience, expertise, and, crucially, 
socialization.6 One important socialization factor the authors single out is child rearing practices 
(see also Chan et al. 2009; Fernald and Morikawa 1993). They observe that:   
East Asians live in relatively complex social networks with prescribed role 
relations. Attention to context is, therefore, important for effective functioning. In 
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contrast, Westerners live in less constraining social worlds that stress independence 
and allow them to pay less attention to context (12633).  
Accordingly, because attention-management is, from birth, a socially scaffolded process 
(Krueger 2013b), different cultural expectations about roles, relations, and norm-governed 
practices will shape how caregivers teach infants to selectively attend to the world around them. 
Infants learn to constitute their world of experience in ways that reflect their situatedness in 
richly structured contexts of betweenness.  
Other evidence supports this claim. For instance, similar cultural variations in attention 
have been found in studies of Canadian and Japanese children’s drawings (Senzaki et al. 2014). 
The former tends to adopt object-focused drawing styles whereas the latter place the horizon 
higher in visual space in order to include more contextual information. Even 24-month-old 
infants (e.g., American and Chinese) already exhibit similar culturally inflected patterns of 
attention (Waxman et al. 2016). The takeaway point, then, is that this evidence — in line with 
Watsuji’s betweenness-based arguments — suggests that fundamental mechanisms by which the 
world shows up as a potential object of experience are not impervious to the influence of 
betweenness. Intentionality is social all the way down.  
    
2.4 The anticipatory structure of intentionality 
Watsuji’s analysis of the social character intentionality harbors a second important dimension 
worth considering. We can make this second dimension clearer by returning to his discussion of 
“reciprocity”. As we’ve seen, for Watsuji intentionality is an active, world-engaged process. We 
not only engage with the world, however — the world, in turn, engages with us. When I reach 
out and pick up my coffee mug, that mug provides ongoing feedback specifying possible things I 
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can do with it. Because it has a distinctive size, solidity, texture and structure — and because, 
moreover, I have a body with a particular set of sensorimotor skills and habits — I can grasp and 
use it in a way I can’t, say, an egg, dandelion, or ladybug. There is a sense in which the character 
of the mug, as an intentional object, tells me what I can do with it; how it shows up in my 
experience is as an object that both affords and occludes certain interactive possibilities.        
Put differently, for Watsuji, this back-and-forth reciprocity specifies a field of possibilities, 
or set of anticipations, that are part of the character of our experience. This idea is found in 
somewhat elusive formulations such as when, approvingly citing Heidegger Watsuji writes:  
“A being there”, despite existing in the world, finds space in its concern with what 
is at hand. Tools are “at hand”, or in their region (Gegend) and occupy their place 
(Platz). Space such as an environmental region implies that it is itself in the world 
but is not a field that renders possible the world within itself. For this region, the 
ontological subject is itself spatial, as a being in the world (Watsuji 1996, 174).    
For Watsuji, “ontological subjects” live the spaces they inhabit — they aren’t simply passively 
situated in these spaces but can actively transcend them — and therefore they perceive further 
interactive possibilities via the “practical interconnections” that exist between themselves and the 
meaningful things they engage with. Simply making coffee in the morning, turning on my 
computer to begin writing, or emptying the trash is an active reconfiguration of my lived space 
and the possibilities that comprise that space.  
However, as is always the case for Watsuji, this anticipatory character of experience 
harbors an irreducible social dimension operative at a fundamental level. This is because 
individuals perceive a landscape of possibilities only insofar as they are rooted in a shared world 
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with others. As Watsuji tells us, this time critiquing what he sees as Heidegger’s neglect of the 
social: 
A subjectivity based on a concern with tools is possible only if tools are already 
established in human relationships. Only when we extract the element of the 
individual from these human relationships and keep our focus on the individual 
while considering his human activities are we able to come to grips with the 
concern with tools (Watsuji 1996, 175). 
What this seems to mean for Watsuji is that tools like hammers, smartphones, and hymnals only 
acquire their meaning — and afford their respective interactive possibilities — insofar as they 
are persistently situated within intersubjective space, that is, rich networks of customs and 
practices in which “these tools have already emerged out of those human relationships involved 
in collective labor” (176). So, the point for Watsuji is not just that we learn how to use things by 
watching others (although we do). Rather, the more subtle point is that salience of a tool’s 
interactive possibilities, the range of things we can potentially do with it, is in some “deep” sense 
modulated, in an ongoing way, by our persistent connection with others and a shared world. To 
return to analysis from the previous section: how a tool is constituted as an intentional object — 
including what sort of interactive possibilities it affords — depends upon both features of the 
tool as well as on our ongoing connection with others. For Watsuji, the anticipatory character of 
intentionality is thus coextensive with a persistent sense of betweenness. As we’ll see shortly, 
this idea gains plausibility when we see that in schizophrenia, a disturbance of the latter 
potentially ramifies throughout the former.      
Before turning to psychopathology, however, we can unpack Watsuji’s claim here further 
by noting that within the phenomenological tradition, both Husserl and Merleau-Ponty use the 
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concept of “horizon” to capture this anticipatory structure of intentionality. Simply put, the 
“horizonal” structure of experience refers to the fact that, when perceiving something like a mug, 
we experience the mug as wholly present, even though we only see, strictly speaking, the part 
facing us at that moment. Additionally, we experience the mug as stable and unchanging even as 
our relationship to it changes — i.e., we move nearer, farther away, walk around it, grasp it and 
rotate in our grip, etc. — and accordingly perceive the whole object via momentary and partial 
appearances. How is this possible?  
For phenomenologists, it is because we perceive what is both present and possible; the 
latter is as constitutive of perception as is the former. In other words, we experience what is 
perceivable from our current vantage point as well as other possible vantage points that we or 
others can potentially adopt: “Everywhere, apprehension includes in itself, by the mediation of a 
‘sense’, empty horizons of ‘possible perceptions’; thus I can, at any given time, enter into a 
system of possible and, if I follow them up, actual, perceptual nexuses” (Husserl 1989, 42). 
Elsewhere, Husserl — anticipating Merleau-Ponty’s emphasis on the motor dimension of 
intentionality — clarifies that horizons involve a kinaesthetic element or mode of active 
anticipation: 
The possibilities of transition are practical possibilities, at least when it is a 
question of an object which is given as enduring without change. There is thus a 
freedom to run through the appearances in such a way that I move my eyes, my 
head, alter the posture of my body, go around the object, direct my regard toward it, 
and so on. We call these movements, which belong to the essence of perception and 
serve to bring the object of perception to givenness from all sides insofar as 
possible, kinaestheses (Husserl 1973, 83–84). 
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To be clear, the anticipatory “horizon” is not an addition to, or extra element within, our 
experience. Rather, it is constitutive of our experience of what an object is — and crucially for 
our purposes, how it is manifest to consciousness, its mode of presentation as an intentional 
object. 
Again, what is particularly important here for this discussion is that, for Watsuji, this 
anticipatory horizon is often regulated not just by our sensorimotor capacities but also by our 
sociocultural milieu: the intersubjective space in which intentional objects stand out with their 
distinctive salience and significance. To help motivate this idea, consider an example provided 
by van den Berg: the different ways that the same city can appear, experientially, when showing 
a guest around town. He writes: 
...one can learn to know another best by traveling with him through a country or by 
looking at a town with him. One who often shows the same town to different 
people will be struck by the ever new way in which this town appears in the 
conversation that is held about the sights during such a walk. These different ways 
are identical with the people with whom one walks, they are forms of subjectivity 
(van den Berg 1952, 166).  
In van den Berg’s example, as we stroll around the city pointing out sites of interest, the ongoing 
input of our guest will regulate the character of how we experience the city, how it shows up as 
an intentional object. If our guest is dismissive or uninterested, the city will appear flat and 
lifeless, devoid of compelling features or possibilities that previously excited us. Jointly 
experiencing something with another can thus impoverish or down-regulate our experience of it. 
As van den Berg observes, “We all know people in whose company we would prefer not to go 
shopping, not to visit a museum, not to look at a landscape, because we would like to keep these 
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things unharmed” (van den Berg 1972, 65). Of course, the presence of others can deeply enrich 
our experience, too, such as when they enthusiastically respond to our tour and affirm our 
appreciation of the city’s compelling qualities. Their input may even open us up to new 
interactive possibilities that we’d not previously experienced — or perhaps enable us to see 
familiar possibilities in a new and fresh way.  
To conclude this section, the salient point is that the feeling of being with others shapes and 
regulates, in an ongoing way, the anticipatory character of how we experience the world in their 
presence — including what interactive possibilities are manifest as present (or absent, as the case 
may be). And the more general takeaway message is that, for Watsuji, the character of how some 
intentional objects appear to us — their particular “how” or mode of presentation — does not 
simply reflect features of our neurophysiology, our sensorimotor capacities, or even features of 
the objects and spaces themselves. Additionally, this character is shaped and regulated by the 
social world, including the feeling of what we can do with others. In this way is the deep 
structure of intentionality bound up with betweenness. As we’ll now see, when this persistent 
feeling of being rooted in a shared world with others is lost — such as we find in 
psychopathological conditions like schizophrenia — the integrity and stability of experience can 
become deeply compromised. 
  
3. Psychopathology and disturbances of intentionality and betweenness  
I now argue that Watsuji’s characterization of the social character of intentionality is useful for 
illuminating subtle experiential anomalies distinctive of schizophrenia, particularly in the 
prodromal phase preceding the onset of full-blown psychosis. More precisely, it can help 
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illuminate subtle disturbances of intentionality, including how these disturbances flow from a 
loss of persistent connectedness with the social world. I begin with some brief background. 
 
3.1 Kimura, schizophrenia, and the ipseity-disturbance model of schizophrenia 
I am not the first to see a link between Watsuji’s work on betweenness and psychopathology. 
The Japanese psychiatrist Bin Kimura explicitly appeals to Watsuji in various texts exploring the 
character of different mental disorders (Stevens 2003; Van Duppen 2017). For example, Kimura 
argues that a cluster of phobias common among Japanese patients but rarely found among non-
Japanese patients — phobias that are, he says, part of a more “general fear of facing others” 
(taijin kyofu-sho), such as a fear that one’s face is ugly or red, that one’s body smells badly, or a 
fear of being looked at or making inappropriate eye contact — can be illuminated by 
acknowledging the predominantly relational or betweenness-oriented sense of self distinctive of 
Japanese culture (Kimura 1972; see also Arisaka 2001). Part of the anxious character of these 
disorders, Kimura argues, stems from the fear one experiences when anticipating the 
embarrassment these conditions may cause others (i.e., those who must view one’s ugly face, 
smell one’s offensive odor, etc.).  
Kimura also applies this betweenness-based framework to schizophrenia (Krueger 2019b). 
For Kimura, schizophrenia is more than just a brain disorder. It is a self-disorder — a multi-level 
disturbance of the individual’s relationship with their world. At the heart of this disturbance, 
according to Kimura, is a disturbance of the sense of “I-ness”, the preflective sense that one is an 
enduring subject of experience. However, Kimura — drawing upon Watsuji — argues that this 
disturbance also has an other-directed intersubjective dimension: a disruption of the 
“interpersonal between” weaving individuals into their sociocultural milieu, as he puts it. Kimura 
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insists that these two dimensions “represent different aspects of one and the same basic 
occurrence of schizophrenic estrangement” (Kimura 1982, 182). Consequently, schizophrenia 
cannot be understood just by looking at functional disorders in the brain, or even by looking at 
disturbances of individual self-consciousness. This is because it ultimately manifests as “a 
striking event of the interhuman world or as a pathology of the “between” in the most 
unmediated and unequivocal way” (178-179).  
Others working in phenomenological psychopathology echo Kimura’s characterization of 
schizophrenia as a self-disturbance. They argue that the generative disorder of schizophrenia is a 
disturbance of the first-person perspective: a disturbance of the “sense of mineness” that 
accompanies all episodes of consciousness (Sass and Parnas 2003; see also Henriksen and 
Nordgaard 2014; Raballo et al. 2011). This sense of mineness is a minimal form of selfhood, the 
integrity of which is presupposed by other richer and more complex forms of selfhood (e.g., 
narrative forms of self). It refers to the first-person quality of experience — “the distinct manner, 
or how, of experiencing” that specifies intentional objects as given to me, in my field of 
experience (Zahavi 2014, 22). When I see a sunset, hear a bird’s song, savor a rich whisky, or 
remember my deceased grandmother, I have these experiences in a first-personal way. I 
immediately recognize them as my own, as experiences that belong to me and not to someone 
else.     
Some argue that this minimal self is altered or disturbed in schizophrenia. According to 
this so-called ipseity disturbance model (IDM) — ipse is Latin for “self” or “itself” — this 
disturbance can include a diminished sense of existing as a bodily subject, a weakened sense of 
ownership of one’s thoughts and experience, a gradual fragmentation or loss of coherence of the 
field of awareness, and disturbed self–world, self–other boundaries (Parnas et al. 2005). 
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Indications of this ipseity disturbance are found in reports from first-admitted patients. 
Individuals often describe feeling as though they do not exist, and that they lack an inner core or 
sense of immediacy with respect to their own experience. They say things like: “I have a feeling 
like it is not me experiencing the world; it feels as if another person was here instead of me”; 
“My feeling of experience as my own experience only appears a split second delayed”; and “My 
first-person perspective is replaced by a third-person perspective” (245-246.).       
Phenomenological approaches to ipseity disturbances have proven useful for understanding 
early anomalous experiences in schizophrenia. In a clinical context, these descriptions can aid 
intervention efforts, assist differential diagnosis (since certain forms of self-disturbances appear 
unique to schizophrenia), and also increase our understanding of, and empathy for, the patient’s 
lived experience — an empathy that in the context of a clinical interview can bring the patient 
some relief when they feel the interviewer is familiar with aspects of their experience (Henriksen 
and Nordgaard 2016, 278). However, ipseity approaches can be enriched by highlighting how 
various forms of disrupted intentionality co-occur with, or exacerbate, disruptions of ipseity.7 
This is where Watsuji can help.   
  
3.2 Schizophrenia and disturbances of intentionality and betweenness 
There is evidence that structures of intentionality can become altered or disturbed in 
schizophrenia. For example, Fuchs (2007) draws on Husserl’s (1991) analysis of “inner time 
consciousness” to relate schizophrenic disorders to the temporal structure of consciousness and 
intentionality. According to Husserl, the temporal microstructure of consciousness — as 
intentional — consists of a dynamic self-organizing process comprised of both a retention of 
what was just perceived or thought, as well as an anticipatory protention of what one expects to 
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continue perceiving or thinking. A melody, for example, is only perceived as a melody insofar as 
we are aware not just of what is currently being played, but also how the present notes relate to 
what has just been played, along with our anticipations of how the melody will continue. The 
coherence of experience thus exhibits a temporal “thickness”. For Husserl, this temporal 
synthesis is a tacit background process organizing our experiences — and the intentional acts 
that comprise them — into sequences of coherent units. It is also crucial for organizing the 
anticipatory character of experience, discussed previously. 
This temporal microstructure of intentional consciousness can become disturbed in 
schizophrenia (Fuchs 2007, 233).  As a result, patients’ capacity to make sense of situations and 
experiences — as well as others’ behavior — is impaired. For example, in the early stages of 
psychosis, experiences such as the loss of one’s train of thought, difficulty following 
conversations, or difficulty maintaining narrative coherence are common (see also Gallagher 
2007). One patient says, “I’m a good listener but often I’m not really taking it in. I nod my head 
and smile but it’s just a lot of jumbled up words to me” (McGhie and Chapman 1961, 106). 
Another says, “Time is somehow changed. It isn’t supposed to be the way it is. I don’t know in 
what way” (Sass et al. 2017, 24).  
This temporal disruption also destabilizes the dynamics of motor intentional processes — 
our ability to enact “practical act-connections”, as Watsuji terms them. One patient describes the 
experience this way: “I found recently that I was thinking of myself doing things before I would 
do them.  If I am going to sit down, for example, I have got to think of myself and almost see 
myself sitting down before I do it. It’s the same with other things like washing, eating, and even 
dressing” (McGhie and Chapman 1961, 107). In these cases, actions that are normally performed 
with an unreflective spontaneity are taken up in a deliberate and thoughtful way; each movement 
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is considered in isolation from the others, leading to a “disautomation” that compromises the 
individual’s ability to smoothly negotiate their physical and social environments (Fuchs 2007, 
233).  
Watsuji’s analysis of the interrelation of intentionality and betweenness can help bring 
another important dimension of these disturbances to light. The idea, in short, is that disturbances 
of intentionality don’t exclusively originate from more fundamental ipseity disturbances — i.e., 
disturbances of a presocial minimal self — as is sometimes thought to be the case (e.g., Raballo 
et al. 2011). Watsuji’s analysis can instead help illuminate how erosions of betweenness 
potentially disrupt an individual’s intentional relation with the world. As we saw previously, for 
Watsuji the character and structure of intentionality is constitutively dependent upon an 
individual's deep integration with their sociocultural environment. It follows, accordingly, that 
when certain aspects of this social integration are disrupted or lost altogether, the structural 
integrity and phenomenological stability of their experiences can become deeply compromised. 
This Watsuji-informed perspective therefore suggests that some of the causes of schizophrenia 
do not reside solely within the individual but also within the dynamics of their broader relation to 
a shared world. Self-disturbances in schizophrenia are equally relational disturbances (Ratcliffe 
2017a; see also Fuchs 2015; Krueger 2018).  
A full defense of this claim will have to wait for another time. Here, I will only offer a 
brief sketch.8 Consider first reports indicating how individuals with schizophrenia lose the 
persistent feeling that are bodily rooted in a common intersubjective space with others. Many 
will say things like, “People move weirdly about...make gestures, movements without sense”; “I 
simply cannot grasp what others do”; “There is a pane of glass between me and mankind”; “The 
others know the [social] rules; I have to study them” (Sass et al. 2017, 26–27). Individuals 
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describe feeling as though they are cut off from the sociocultural and material aspects of 
betweenness that most of us take for granted in everyday life.  
This felt lack of social rootedness flows, at least in part, from a disturbance of what Froese 
and Fuchs (2012) term “inter-bodily resonance”: the capacity to “resonate” with the bodily 
expressions and emotions of other people. It is well-established that motor mimicry (i.e., 
spontaneous mimicry of others’ facial expressions, gestures, movements, and intonation patterns) 
and behavioral synchrony (i.e., synchronizing speech rhythms and bodily movements over short 
and long-term timescales) are crucial mechanisms for social understanding (Bernieri and 
Rosenthal 1991; Wiltermuth and Heath 2009). When we interact with others, their expressive 
actions — their gestures, facial expressions, postural adjustments, intonation patterns, 
movements and manipulations of shared space, etc. — directly impact our bodily and emotional 
responses (Krueger 2011). These resonance processes promote social cohesion and strengthen 
feelings of connectedness, rapport, and cooperation (Lakin and Chartrand 2003; van Baaren et al. 
2004). We might think of these processes as mechanisms responsible for the forms of bodily 
betweenness Watsuji describes.  
These bodily processes are disturbed in schizophrenia. Not only do individuals describe 
feeling a kind of experiential distance or alienation from their own body — e.g., “it’s like I’m not 
in my body or not attached to it”; “My body feels alien to me” (Krueger and Henriksen 2016). 
This experiential disturbance is also manifest in the ways that individuals with schizophrenia 
exhibit diminished facial, gestural, and vocal expressivity, which in turn diminishes the sort of 
resonance responses they elicit from others (Kring and Elis 2013). Moreover, individuals with 
schizophrenia often show a deficit in their ability to detect and respond to the facial and gestural 
expressions of others (Amminger et al. 2012; Chan et al. 2010; Edwards et al. 2002). As a result, 
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this lack of perceptual access and responsiveness to others’ bodily expressions contributes to the 
individual’s loss of social attunement and general feeling of disconnectedness from others — a 
feeling, in other words, that they are not responsive participants within the dimensions and 
intensities of betweenness that characterize everyday life. This feeling is articulated in remarks 
like, “There is a pane of glass between me and mankind”; “A wall of void isolate me from 
everybody” (Sass et al. 2017, 27).   
For this discussion, the key point is that this disturbance of betweenness ramifies 
throughout schizophrenic individuals’ intentional relations with the world and others. Changes in 
interpersonal experience at a basic bodily level affect the deep structure of intentionality — 
including its anticipatory dimension. This dimension, the integrity and character of which 
depends (as we saw above) on feeling a persistent connectedness with others, becomes unstable, 
ambiguous, and indeterminate: e.g., “more and more, I lost the feeling of practical things”; 
“objects are stage trappings placed here and there, geometric cubes without meaning”; “the 
others know the rules; I have to study them” (Sass et al. 2017, 37, 38, 27) . In virtue of their 
disturbed bodily betweenness, individuals become viscerally isolated from a public world writ 
large; disengaged from the everyday projects, possibilities, and practical activities that 
continually affirm our connections with others; fail to receive forms of interpersonal validation 
both small and large; and, as we’ve seen, fall out-of-sync with the shared emotions, concerns, 
and wider structures that govern our myriad encounters with others and our joint actions in the 
world (Ratcliffe 2017b, 151).  
As a result, the character of how the world appears, experientially — its manifestation as 
an intentional object — is altered without the persistent scaffolding of this betweenness. Ratcliffe 
puts this point well when he tells us that, “The kinds of possibility attached to entities in the 
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surrounding environment are, to a substantial degree, consistent and enduring, a consistency that 
depends partly on relations with others” (Ratcliffe 2017a, 159). When these relations become 
disturbed, the character of intentional processes that disclose possibilities “attached to entities” 
are also compromised. Self-disturbances in schizophrenia are thus equally relational disturbances 
— disturbances of betweenness. 
 
4. Conclusion 
I have argued that Watsuji develops a philosophically rich and timely characterization of 
intentionality worthy of further attention. His account productively stresses the centrality of 
embodiment and agency. For Watsuji, intentionality is not an intrinsic feature of mental states 
but rather a relational property of the whole person engaging with the things, spaces, and people 
in a common world. More strongly, for Watsuji features of this shared world are, are we’ve seen, 
constituent features of the intentional processes that bind us to this very world. The character and 
content of our intentional acts — which determine how the world and things in it show up as 
objects of experience — are deeply regulated by betweenness. Accordingly, we cannot 
understand intentionality without considering its constitutive interrelation with betweenness. 
However, Watsuji’s view here is not simply of interest to phenomenologists. I’ve argued 
further that this social characterization of intentionality can help further illuminate experiential 
anomalies in psychopathology, and particularly schizophrenia. Building upon Kimura’s Watsuji-
inspired approach, I’ve argued that thinking of schizophrenia exclusively as a self-disorder may 
be too narrow a perspective. What is needed, rather, is a framework that brings to light the 
irreducibly relational character of these self-disturbances — that is, a framework that helps 
better understand the ways that losing touch with others is, simultaneously, to lose touch with the 
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resources that give us a world of experience in the first place. A better understanding of these 
experiences can deepen our empathy for those in their grip and equip us with conceptual and 
clinical resources to better reach them. As with many other areas, Watsuji can contribute 
important theoretical tools for undertaking this work.  
 
Notes
1 For a helpful overview and bibliography, see Carter and McCarthy (2017).  
2 See Mayeda (2006) for a detailed look at Watsuji’s critical relationship with Heidegger. 
3 Whether or not Husserl is guilty of these sins (probably not) need not concern us here. For 
absolution, see Zahavi (2017, 77–136) and Moran (2017). Nevertheless, there are contemporary 
theorists who are happy to locate intentionality entirely in the head and limit it to traditionally 
defined internal mental states. Horgan and Kriegel (2008), for example, defend a “strongly 
internalist, broadly Cartesian picture of the mind” and phenomenal intentionality. For an 
alternative enactive view — closer in spirit to Watsuji (although they don’t discuss him) — see 
Gallagher and Miyahara (2012).     
4 Some of Watsuji’s formulations here and elsewhere anticipate recent enactive approaches to 
cognition which stress the central role agency plays in structuring cognitive, perceptual, and 
affective processes (e.g., Colombetti 2014; Gallagher 2017; Noë 2009). 
5 For example, he says that “phenomenology from beginning to end analyzed individual 
consciousness only. Even after attention was deepened from consciousness to being, it was still 
concerned with “individual being”” (Watsuji 1996, 219).  
6 Similar effects have been observed in the visual perception of objects and space (Boduroglu et 
al. 2009; Kelly et al. 2010; Saulton et al. 2017).  
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7 For a related friendly critique of the potential narrowness of ipseity approaches, see Krueger 
(2018).  
8 Ratcliffe (2017a, 2017b) defends a social account of self-disturbances in schizophrenia very 
close to the one I am advocating here.  
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